University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2002

Crisis and Constitutionalism
Michael J. Gerhardt
University of North Carolina School of Law, gerhardt@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Publication: Montana Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

ARTICLE*

CRISIS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
Michael J. Gerhardt**

I. INTRODUCTION
No one loves a good crisis more than a constitutional law
professor. We live for crises. We make our living writing and
talking about them. And, in recent years, there has been a lot
for us to write and talk about. In the past few decades, we have
experienced such astonishing events as three serious
impeachment attempts against presidents, several undeclared
wars, including the current war at home and abroad against
terrorism; a major, post-election dispute between the major
presidential candidates, including the first time the Supreme
Court resolved a judicial contest over a presidential election and
arguably picked the winner; and several of the closest, most
contentious Supreme Court confirmation hearings ever. Indeed,
*Professor Michael J. Gerhardt delivered this Article at the University of Montana
School of Law on February 28, 2002, as the inaugural Judge James R. Browning
Distinguished Lecturer in Law.
**Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful for
constructive feedback I received from Tom Baker, Bill Van Alstyne, and the participants
in a faculty workshop at William & Mary Law School, for the extraordinary honor of
serving as the first Judge James R. Browning Distinguished Lecturer in Law, and for the
wonderful hospitality I received during my visit to the University of Montana Law
School as the first Browning Lecturer.
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if you wanted to find another generation that has faced anything
like the domestic challenges that have confronted us in recent
years, you would have to go all the way back to the Civil War.
We have come to know each of these events as either
constituting or barely avoiding a crisis in constitutional law. 1
1. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 604
n.74 (1983) (noting that "If, for example, President Nixon had refused to give the
'Watergate' tapes to the Special Prosecutor after the Supreme Court ordered him to do so
in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), a constitutional crisis could well have
resulted."); Candace H: Beckett, Separation of Powers and Federalism: Their Impact on
Individual Liberty and the Functioning of Our Government, 29 WM. & MARYL. REV. 635,
644 (1988) ("During the most serious constitutional crisis of recent decades, even
countries with democratic heritages, such as those of Western Europe, could not
understand American concerns with the Nixon Administration's transgressions of power.
But Americans were alarmed, and the checks and balances locomotive went into high
gear. Congress investigated the activities, the courts interpreted the law, and the press,
protected by the first amendment, reported the developments that resulted in the
downfall of an administration."); Alfredo Garcia, "No Fetish" for Privacy, Fairness, or
Justice: Why William Rehnquist, Not Ken Starr, Was Responsible for William Jefferson
Clinton's Impeachment, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 511, 513, (2001) ("My aim is to
place the 'affair,' and the constitutional crisis it engendered, in a broader perspective. In
short, the Starr investigation illustrated the Rehnquist Court's extreme deference to law
enforcement objectives, to the detriment of the liberty interests of American citizens and
the legitimacy of its own jurisprudence;" id. at 575. "At the outset of this endeavor, I
sought to give a broader explanation for the constitutional crisis that embroiled the
nation as a result of an illicit affair between the President and a young, impressionable
intern, and the President's attempt to deny it;" id. at 580. "The Clinton constitutional
crisis emerged not from a "politically naive" Supreme Court; it was born of ignorance of
the ramifications of criminal constitutional jurisprudence in the most "real" of worlds.");
Timothy Zick, The Consent of the Governed: Recall of United States Senators, 103 DICK.
L. REV. 567, 610 (1999) ("If the country learned anything from the constitutional crisis
brought about by the impeachment proceedings involving President Clinton, it was that
the people can indeed put aside self-interest and partisanship for the common good. In
other words, they proved themselves capable of choosing whom they please to govern
them. The Framers' two-thirds vote requirement may have been the safeguard that
ultimately prevented the president's impeachment, but the peoples' voices were also
heard throughout the process that led to President Clinton's acquittal."); Mark Tushnet,
The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the
Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 60-61 (1999) (footnotes
omitted) (maintaining that the Clinton impeachment was not a constitutional crisis)
("[A]s President Clinton's impeachment and its outcome have demonstrated,
impeachment need not be anything major. The impeachment of President Clinton seems
to have had little effect qua impeachment. Within six months of President Clinton's
acquittal, a leading Republican was quoted as observing, 'We have a president rolling the
Congress, getting everything he wants.' Rather than as a constitutional crisis, we might
see the impeachment as a 'no harm, no foul' event: anticipating an acquittal, a highly
partisan and polarized House of Representatives satisfied its majority's partisan
interests by voting for impeachment, without destabilizing the constitutional order.
Similarly, future presidents might conclude that there is no serious risk in practicing the
politics of preemption: impeachment might occur, but without serious consequences.");
Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson: Comparing Two
Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 459 (2000) ("The Clinton impeachment was so
unsatisfying in part because it seemed so constitutionally unimportant. The heaviest
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artillery in the constitutional arsenal was called out to address a scandal of the meanest
character. Despite a numbing amount of commentary on the scandal, there was
surprisingly little effort to explain the constitutional value of an impeachment.
Republicans seemed to assume that Clinton had defaulted on his presidency and could
be removed from office on a technicality. The President and his defenders, of course,
were in no position to advance a rich constitutional defense of the presidency, but they
seemed content to exploit Republican weaknesses. With its foreordained outcome and
sordid subject matter, the impeachment was a constitutional crisis only in its banality.");
Cass R. Sunstein, Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.737, 758 (2001)
("The Court's decision in Bush v Gore [produced] a prompt and decisive conclusion to the
chaotic post-election period of 2000. Indeed, it probably did so in a way that carried more
simplicity and authority than anything that might have been expected from the United
States Congress. The Court might even have avoided a genuine constitutional crisis.");
Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1,. 46 ("Consideration of the
practicalities of continued recounting is notable by its absence from the opinions of the
dissenting Justices in Bush v Gore. They were content to leave the matter to be resolved
by Congress in January-or later, for that matter. I cannot see the case for precipitating
a political and constitutional crisis merely in order to fuss with a statistical tie that,
given the inherent subjectivity involved in hand counting spoiled ballots, can never be
untied. Had the responsibility for determining who would be President fallen to
Congress in January, there would have been a competition in indignation between the
parties' supporters, with each side accusing the other of having stolen the election.
Whatever Congress did would have been regarded as the product of raw politics, with no
tincture of justice. The new President would have been deprived of a transition period in
which to organize his administration and would have taken office against a background
of unprecedented bitterness. His "victory" would have been an empty one; he could not
have governed effectively."); Feature, War Powers Revisited, 37 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 171,
180 (2001) "[The) lengthy and persistent struggle between the branches over the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution has proven impervious to political
resolution, in somewhat the same manner as the constitutional controversies over the
President's power to remove Executive officials and the legislative veto could not be
resolved politically. Judicial resolution of the issue is the only method to resolve this
intractable dispute between the political branches over their respective constitutional
authorities before it erupts again in the context of another constitutional crisis of the
order presented by the Vietnam War. Judicial resolution could prevent the inevitable
repetition of the traumatic constitutional experience the country and the government
experienced during that war - an experience from which the Congress sought to protect
the Nation by enacting the War Powers Resolution. The cost of judicial abstention now is
likely to be paid by future generations."); Memorandum, Indochina: The Constitutional
Crisis, reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 15,409, 15,411 (1970) (authored by Yale Law
Professors Alexander Bickel and Elias Clark, 12 Yale law students, and a number of
prominent lawyers); William D. Rogers, The United States Constitution In Its Third
Century: Foreign Affairs: Epilogue: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs: Two Hundred
Years, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 894, 895 (1989) ("The Iran-contra affair then can be seen as the
capstone incident of an extended period of constitutional competition between the
branches over foreign policy. Persuaded that Congress was wrong, a band of zealots
seized a piece of the international relations power of the executive branch, cutting
squarely across the expressed legislative policy of the Boland amendment. In the effort,
they lied to Congress (and may have misled even the President himself ... It is therefore
something of a paradox that, within 2 years of Iran-contra, there should be so general a
sense that the nation is moving away from the concerns that inspired the constitutional
crisis and toward a new bipartisanship in foreign affairs."); Dr. Anthony Simones, The
Iran-Contra Affair: Ten Years Later, 67 UMKC L. REV. 61, 75 (1998) ("The Iran-Contra
Affair did not occur merely because the Reagan Administration thought it could pursue
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There are, however, two major problems with such
characterizations. The first is that none of these events
constitutes a genuine crisis. The second is, in spite of all of the
interest constitutional scholars have had in crises, most do not
define what they mean by a constitutional crisis. Indeed, there
is no consensus on any standards for determining what
constitutes a crisis in constitutional law. 2 In short, we lack any
its initiatives secretly. It occurred because our system allowed the Reagan
Administration to believe it could pursue its initiatives secretly, while it encouraged
Congress to insist on access and accountability... Ours is a system which allows the
President to engage in covert operations which require secrecy for their success, yet
which gives Congress access to information about those operations, and which ultimately
provides the President with a weapon that he may use to keep this information from
Congress. When both Congress and the Reagan Administrations sought to avail
themselves of the opportunities presented by our constitutional system, the struggle
between secrecy and accountability produced a constitutional crisis."); Laurence H.
Tribe, Reagan Ignites a Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1987, at A31 ("When
Ronald Reagan was elected on an antigovernment platform, pundits smiled. When
incumbent President Reagan was re-elected on such a platform, political scientists were
puzzled. But when the President's status as a perpetually bemused and patriotic
outsider is transformed from a political stance into a shield against the rule of law, a
constitutional crisis is at hand.").
2. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, "To Do A Great Right, Do A Little Wrong"; A User's
Guide to Judicial Lawlessness," 86 MINN. L. REV. 227, 245-46 (2001) (footnote omitted)
("The usual definition of a constitutional crisis is a dispute between coequal branches of
government about the Constitution's meaning that calls into question the authority of
either one to trump the other."); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The
Independence of the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 88
(1998) ("[W]hen Congress and the President have tested the constitutional limits of their
power over the courts ... the result has typically been a constitutional crisis. Some
obvious examples include the 1801 Act and its repeal, the 1805 impeachment
proceedings against Justice Samuel Chase, the 1937 court-packing plan of Franklin
Roosevelt and the 1989 nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. Constitutional
crises are occasionally unavoidable and instructive, but they are hardly to be encouraged
or held aloft as defining features of a constitutional democracy in good repair."); Robert
G. Kaiser, No "Crisis" Yet From Electoral Uncertainty, Say Legal Scholars, WASH. POST,
Dec. 11, 2000, at Al0 (quoting John Yoo as saying a "constitutional crisis is if people
ignore or attack the Constitution"; Christopher Schroeder as suggesting a constitutional
crisis arises when "one of the branches of the government decides not to acknowledge
and accede to . . . the legitimate authority of another branch of government"; and
Michael Gerhardt as defining "a constitutional crisis as a confrontation of great national
importance "in which the Constitution does not provide a clear answer ... "); Miles
Benson & J. Scott Orr, Staying Alive; Stage May Be Set For a Constitutional Crisis, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 10, 2000, at Gl ("Dean L. Kinvin Wroth of Vermont Law School
defines a constitutional crisis as 'the point at which one branch or level of government
declines to obey the mandate of another."); Dana Milbank, Worst-Case Scenario: The
U.S. Has None; Constitutional Crisis, Chaos Forseen if Top Leaders Killed, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 2001, at Al (quoting Washington State Rep. Brian Baird as stating "If somebody
hits us in a severe and coordinated attack, there will be great confusion and possibly a
constitutional crisis."); H. John Rogers, Presidency on a Platter; High Court Supremely
Bold in Election Ruling, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Feb. 2, 2001, at 5A ("The
system works tolerably well as long as the judiciary only snips at the heels of the
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constitutional values are implemented.
If one were genuinely interested in determining how written
constitutionalism gets implemented (and that is the process by
which the Constitution's binding authority operates), courts are
not the best place to look. It might be useful to examine those
instances in which adherence to the written Constitution is
getting stretched to, if not beyond, the limit. If, as is commonly
suggested, a constitution's mandates are "proscribed by Philip
sober to control Philip drunk, "6 there is likelier to be no instance
in which Philip is more drunk or less disposed to act responsibly
than a genuine crisis in which authorities are severely tempted
to take their powers beyond the written limits set forth in the
Constitution.
So, my first objective is to explain the criteria for
determining a crisis in constitutional law. I use these criteria to
clarify the relationship among the three different kinds of crises
in constitutional law - judicial, political, and constitutional.
Once I have clarified the different elements of each of these, I
will demonstrate how this understanding · illuminates the
significance of the recent controversies to which I have referred
above, and how the binding authority of our Constitution is
achieved through its implementation.
Perhaps most
importantly, I suggest constitutional crises are extremely rare
episodes in which national political leaders recognize the
inadequacy of the Constitution. Their recognition that the
Constitution cannot answer the critical problem at hand is an
acknowledgment of the limits of the written Constitution. In
every other circumstance that falls short of a genuine
constitutional crisis, the pull of the Constitution as a framework
not only for discussion but also for resolution of conflict is
evident. Consequently, constitutional crises are distinctive as
the only instances in which the limits of written
constitutionalism are not just reached but also breached.
II. UNDERSTANDING CRISES
There are at least three kinds of crises in constitutional law.
The first is a judicial crisis. It is tempting to define a judicial
crisis as arising when political authorities object to the Court's
6. DAVID BREWER, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AS THE SALVATION OF THE
NATION, IN NEW YORK BAR AsSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK BAR
AsSOCATION 37, 37-47 (1893), reprinted in 11 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA: AGRARIANISM
AND URBANIZATION 1884-1894, at 423,428 (1968).
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framework for judging whether something is a constitutional
crisis or not.
My purpose today is to fill this void. My intention is to
develop a framework for analyzing crises in constitutional law,
and to assess the implications of this framework for
understanding constitutional law. In fact, understanding why
none of the many incidents characterized recently as crises
actually were genuine crises helps to answer one of the biggest,
if not the biggest, question in all of constitutional law: how our
written Constitution continues to bind the nation long after the
deaths of those who drafted and ratified it. 3 Understanding the
elements of a crisis helps to illuminate our continued national
commitment to written constitutionalism.
We are only just now beginning to understand the ways in
which our Constitution binds the nation.
The trick to
understanding how the Constitution retains its binding
authority over time requires us to explore how our Constitution
is implemented, i.e., how its various guarantees, values, and
provisions are translated into action. 4
For many if not most constitutional theorists, the central
institution responsible for implementation of the Constitution is
the federal judiciary. 5 I think legal scholars give courts far too
much credit for maintaining constitutionalism. In fact, courts
are marginally involved in the implementation of the
Constitution. They deal only with a relatively small number of
constitutional issues. Courts are not the principal fora in which
constitutional issues arise or get addressed. In practice, the vast
majority of constitutional issues are dealt with outside of the
courts. It is outside of the courts, in Congress, the White House,
federal agencies, and even state governorships and legislatures,
that constitutional issues are routinely addressed and most
executive and legislative branches of government, but where judges seek to supplant la
volente general with their own socioeconomic thinking (as happened during Roosevelt's
first term) we are brushing up against a real, rather than euphemistic constitutional
crisis.").
3. See generally JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).
4. Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of Theory, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 283 (2001)
(reviewing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND THEORY: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GoVERNMENT (2001)). See also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITIONAL SELFGoVERNMENT (2001); RICHARD H. FALLOW, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSITUTION (2001).
5. Though he arrives at it by a different route, Jed Rubenfeld ends up offering a
relatively typical account of the federal judiciary as the primary institution responsible
for maintaining national commitment to the Constitution over time. RUBENFELD, supra
note 3.
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having struck down or overridden something they have done. If
this were our working definition, I suggest that there would be a
problem, because the definition I have just given you is none
other than the classical understanding of the countermajoritarian difficulty as described by the late Alexander
Bickel, 7 and there would be a crisis each and every time the
Court exercised judicial review to strike down some democratic
enactment or decision. To say that a political objection to a
judicial decision provokes or precipitates a judicial crisis dilutes
the meaning of crisis, because it would mean we have been
experiencing a crisis just about every time an exercise of judicial
review provokes some angry or negative reaction from some
political authorities. It is likely, at least in theory, that a
judicial decision overturning some popular enactment (or action
by a democratically elected official) will anger some
constituency. Some scholars have recently suggested, however,
the extent of such conflicts are greatly exaggerated; 8 they have
argued that only rarely has there been a decision of the Supreme
Court that did not enjoy the support of the majority of
Americans at the time it was decided or soon thereafter. 9
A more plausible definition of judicial crisis arises not when
there is a conflict between the Court and political authorities, 10
but rather when political authorities persistently to refuse to
follow and to retaliate against the Court's answer to a question
of constitutional meaning. Under this definition there have
been remarkably few genuine judicial crises. Many episodes
commonly thought to constitute crises fall short. For instance,
the first time the Court exercised judicial review to strike down
a state law - Chisholm v. Georgia 11 - was so unpopular that it
took literally a matter of days for the decision to be overturned
by a constitutional amendment. 12 While the Chisholm decision

7. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2nd ed.1986).
8. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993).
9. See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore: Through the Lens of Constitutional
History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001).
10. Note that the Court has struck down 28 federal laws in the past six years, but
no scholar has yet designated these decisions as constituting a crisis in constitutional
law. A few scholars have, however, suggested this trend constitutes a revolution in
constitutional law. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
11. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
12. See Klarman, supra note 9.
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provoked some controversy, the controversy subsided almost as
quickly as it arose.
A better candidate for a genuine judicial crisis is the
political fallout from and retaliation against the Court's efforts
to enforce its decision in Brown v. Board of Education 1. 13 The
Southern Manifesto and other acts of defiance and protest
followed almost immediately after the decision came down. 14
The defiance persisted throughout most of the 1960s, until the
President and Congress decisively sided with the Court through
the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other progressive
civil rights measures. Once all three institutions of the national
government fell into line behind desegregation, the resistance
began to break down. 15 By then, Brown had gone for more than
a decade without full implementation in the deep South.
Another popular candidate for a judicial crisis is the conflict
generated by the Supreme Court's propensity to protect
economic liberties and property rights in the first few decades of
the 20 th century. This period covers both the Lochner era16 and
the New Deal era.17 In the Lochner era, or the period from 1893
to 1924, Congress considered 20 proposals to curb the federal
courts' jurisdiction in retaliation against the Court's perceived
activism. 18 In the remarkably brief period from 1935 to 1937,
Congress considered 37 bills proposing to curb the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. 19 During his first term, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and other Democrats publicly criticized the Court's
rulings striking down several New Deal measures. 20 By 1936, as
Michael Klarman suggests, ''both Democrats and Republicans
endorsed state minimum wage legislation, and thus [the Court's
decision in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo21] incited a
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. See generally LUCAS POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
(2000). See also Gerhardt, supra note 4.
15. See Klarman, supra note 9.
16. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001).
17. Klarman, supra note 9 at 1751 (referring to "the New Deal constitutional
crisis" but not explaining why). See also William Carlsen, Roosevelt's End Run Around
the Courts; Secret Trials Provoked Constitutional Crisis, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 30,
2001, at A18 (stating that, "The tense legal drama unfolding in Washington in the
summer of 1942 had all the trappings of a constitutional crisis.").
18. Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, in THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 35, 35-4 7 (Theodore L. Becker ed., 1969).
19. Id. at 36-37.
20. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1751.
21. 97 U.S. 702 (1936).
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firestorm of criticism."22 That decision was the proximate cause
of Roosevelt's infamous Court-packing plan, which was the most
notorious of the many assaults undertaken at the time against
the Court. 23 Though the proposal failed, constitutional scholars
to this day still debate the significance of this failure and its
·connection to the Court's purported "switch in time."24
Yet another possible judicial crisis has been engendered by
Roe v. Wade. 25 The nation remains divided in its agreement
with the fundamental rule announced in the case, and several
presidents - Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W.
Bush - openly campaigned against the decision and purposely
nominated as judges people who were opposed to the decision. 26
To this day, Republican and Democratic presidents make choices
of judicial nominees based to a significant degree on their
attitudes about the legitimacy of Roe. The persistence of the
relevance of Roe to judicial selection indicates the extent to
which the political discord engendered by the decision still
rages.
If a judicial crisis is predicated on persistent political
resistance to a judicial decision, what is a political crisis, and
how does it differ from a judicial crisis? I suggest a political
crisis arises when political authorities are fighting amongst
themselves for supremacy over a particular domain of
policymaking.
Prime examples of political crises (of varying intensity) are
the set of presidential impeachments, beginning with Andrew
Johnson and including Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton. 27 In the
first of these instances, Congress and the President were plainly
in a contest for supremacy in dictating Reconstruction policy.
Interestingly, Johnson was not the first president to have been
threatened with impeachment because of his overzealous use of
the veto (and efforts to assert his will over domestic
policymaking), 28 but he was the first to be impeached and thus
22. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1751.
23. WILLIAM EDWARD LEUCHTENBURG, IN THE SHADOW OF FDR: FROM HARRY
TRUMAN TO GEORGE w. BUSH (3rd ed., rev. & updated 2001).
24. See EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).
25. 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
26. See generally, DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, A PuRsUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
27. See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000 ).
28. Earlier threats of impeachment had been directed against President John
Tyler and President Andrew Jackson.
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to face removal for his understanding and deployment of the
prerogatives of his office. As one can see, the magnitude of the
crisis seems to have diminished with each of the episodes, so the
greatest controversy arises with Johnson because of the great
stakes involving the balance of power, followed by the serious
conflict between Nixon and Congress culminating in his
resignation, and the more tepid conflict - tepid, i.e., by relative
comparison - of the Clinton impeachment ordeal.
At what point does a judicial or political crisis transform
into a constitutional crisis? My answer is only rarely. I
understand a constitutional crisis to arise when conflicting
authorities recognize the limits of the Constitution, i.e., when
contending authorities find or acknowledge that the
Constitution -provides no answer to the controversy at hand. A
constitutional crisis is not necessarily the result of the joining of
judicial and political crises. A constitutional crisis is not just a
serious conflict among the leaders of national political
institutions, or between the courts and the political branches,
but rather a special circumstance in which political leaders
recognize that the Constitution provides no guidance and no
adequate process for resolving the political crisis at hand.
Where have we seen such crises? I suggest two examples
here. The first is that slavery precipitated a political crisis that
ultimately transformed into a constitutional crisis when the
Southern states seceded from the Union. Secession presented
the President and the Congress with a problem for which the
Constitution had no answer. 29 It came about in part because of
the President's and Congress' refusal to back down in trying to
contain or get rid of slavery in spite of Dred Scott u. Sandford. 30
Hence, Dred Scott precipitated a judicial crisis that helped to
transform an ongoing political crisis over slavery into the
constitutional crisis of secession. I do not think Dred Scott,
standing alone, constituted a constitutional crisis, because
political authorities who disagreed with it were not unfamiliar
with how to deal with constitutional decisions with which they
disagreed. Lincoln, for instance, simply refused to acknowledge
the decision as legitimate and thus to enforce it. 31 In doing so,
he took a path previously trod by his predecessors in office who
29. Compare 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) and
MARK V. TuSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW(1988).
30. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
31. See generally id.
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had fought to protect a president's right to disagree with the
Supreme Court and avoid compliance with it, if at all possible. 32
There were, however, no adequate constitutional mechanisms
available to solve secession.
Another example of a constitutional crisis occurred in 1800
when Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr received the same
number of votes in the Electoral College. 33 While they (and their
supporters) knew which had run as president and vicepresident, and thus which should have been considered the
victor in the presidential election, Burr's refusal to acknowledge
the obvious forced the House of Representatives to resolve which
of the two men was president. In making this decision, the
House received no guidance from the Constitution or historical
practices. While the House voted ultimately to designate
Jefferson as President (after several attempts), the confusion,
discord, and uncertainty generated by the tie vote in the
Electoral College between the top two Republicans running in
the election precipitated a movement to amend the Constitution,
culminating in the Twelfth Amendment. 34
Ill. THE BIG PICTURE

The framework I have proposed for clarifying different
kinds of crises in our constitutional system is incomplete. At the
very least, further clarification of the relationship among these
different kinds of crises - and the implications of these
relationships for written constitutionalism - are necessary.
First, judges lack the means to solve genuine political crises,
and national political leaders can be instrumental in helping to
resolve judicial crises. On the few occasions when courts have
triggered crises, judges have had to rely on the political process
ultimately to resolve them. I can think of no judicial crisis that
courts have settled on their own. Even when courts have been
called upon to resolve political crises, they have failed to do so.
Dred Scott is the most spectacular example of such a failure; it
exacerbated rather than helped to resolve the crisis over the
future of slavery in the United States. 35 Again, Dred Scott
32. One obvious model for Lincoln was Andrew Jackson's veto of the Second
National Bank.
33. See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH
AMENDMENT (1994).
34. David P. Currie, Post-Originalism, The Constitution in Congress: The
Jeffersonians, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2001).
35. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN

288

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 63

helped to push the political crisis over slavery into a
constitutional crisis.
Nor can I think of a political crisis that courts have
resolved. When political crises have been resolved short of a
constitutional crisis, it has not been by courts but rather by
political leaders operating within the Constitution's intricate
system of checks and balances. Political crises are resolved
through accommodations however difficultly achieved through
existing constitutional mechanisms. In other words, political
crises can be resolved by political leaders who struggle amongst
themselves until a political rather than a judicial solution is
achieved. The political ill-will generated by the Alien and
Sedition Acts ended not because of anything courts did, but
rather because of the actions of national political leaders. 36
President Lincoln's unilateral suspension of habeas corpus was
undoubtedly a dubious act, which Chief Justice Taney
condemned as lawless; 37 however, its ratification by Congress
very shortly thereafter clarified its legal basis even if the
ratification did not fully resolve the political fallout. 38 Andrew
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (2001).
36. See JOHN CHESTER MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
ACTS (1951).
37. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).
38. The fact that Congress ratified Lincoln's action was not of course the end of the

matter. Indeed, the fact that Congress and the President ultimately joined together to
support suspension of habeas corpus illustrates another kind of political crisis that has
the distinct potential to transform into a constitutional crisis. This situation arises when
national authorities join together to retaliate against some relatively defenseless
segment of the population. This situation entails, in other words, a conflict between
national authorities on the side and a relatively powerless constituency or group on the
other. A prime example of such a conflict is the internment of Japanese-Americans in
World War II. Federal military and political leaders put together the internment plan
with little or no evidence in support, but the Supreme Court ratified it in a closely
divided opinion. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). With political
and judicial authorities unified against them, the incarcerated Japanese-Americans had
no recourse left - the Constitution was literally of no avail to them until well after the
War. A 1980 Act of Congress established a Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians to study the Japanese relocation during World War II. The
Commission concluded, "The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 [which the Court
had upheld in Korematsu] was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions
which followed from it [were] not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad
historical causes which shaped [the exclusion decisions] were race prejudice, war
hysteria, and the failure of political leadership. [Al grave injustice was done." Report of
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice
Denied 18 (1982). In 1984, a federal district court relied on the Commission's findings in
granting a writ of coram nobis and vacating the conviction of Fred Korematsu, the
original defendant in Korematsu. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406
(N.D.Cal. 1984). In 1988, President Reagan signed legislation formally acknowledging
injustices imposed by the internment and providing for the payment of reparations.
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Johnson and Bill Clinton did not challenge their impeachments
in court but rather relied upon the constitutional process to
absolve them.
Courts also played no significant role in resolving the
political and constitutional questions triggered by the Korean,
Vietnam, and Persian Gulf Wars. 39 Courts also will likely not
have a significant role in settling some fundamental questions
arising in the recent against terrorism, such as the legitimacy of
President Bush's executive order authorizing military tribunals
for some non-citizens charged with terrorist activities against
the United States. It is too soon otherwise to predict the
outcomes or the significance of the cases challenging some
aspects of the conditions, such as the secrecy, under which some
people are being detained by the federal government in the war
on terrorism.
While the Watergate tapes case clearly weakened the
political opposition to Nixon's impeachment, 40 it would be wrong
to think that it resolved the political conflict between Nixon and
the Congress.
As Gerald Gunther suggests, democratic
institutions were proceeding methodically to deal with Nixon's
misconduct separate from and without judicial intervention.41
These institutions were not looking to the courts for help or
reinforcement.
Moreover, Gunther suggests that this fact
indicates there really was no genuine crisis provoked by the
movement to impeach Nixon. Had Nixon not resigned, there is
every indication that Nixon would not only have been impeached
but there would also have been little doubt the Senate would
have removed him. 42 The impeachment effort against Nixon had
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 1 (1989)). It is conceivable that in the framework I have suggested that the exclusion
and internment of Japanese-Americans constitute a constitutional crisis because clearly
the Constitution provided no adequate mechanism to protect the Japanese-Americans on
the West Coast from the "historical causes" cited by the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians. More precisely, the lapses and failures that led
to the exclusion and internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II could be
understood as a crisis in which national political, military, and judicial authorities joined
together to deprive them a constitutional remedy for the damage done to them.
39. The legality of each of these "wars" was greatly debated during their respective
durations, and continues to raise questions about where they fit within the
constitutional framework. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1993).
40. Kutler v. United States, 423 U.S. 959 (1975).
41. Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon
Case and the Impeachment Process, 20 UCLA L. REV. 30 (1974).
42. Richard Posner suggests, however, had Nixon been willing to place himself at
the mercy of the American people immediately after the Watergate break-in he might
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a momentum separate from the judicial process.
The Jefferson administration's attempted employment of
the impeachment power to create vacancies in the federal
judiciary posed a different kind of political crisis. 43 It did not
just begin, simply enough, from one judicial decision (or one
judge's actions), but rather the crass desire to use impeachment
to get rid of "unfit" judges apparently defined in such a manner
as only to apply to Federalist judges. This deployment of
impeachment came to a head when the House impeached but
the Senate failed to convict Associate Samuel Chase for various
judicial acts, including providing assistance to prosecutions of
Republicans under the Alien and Sedition Acts passed with the
backing and approval of the Adams administration. 44 Chase's
impeachment was a political crisis because it threatened to
transform the impeachment power into a mechanism to unseat a
justice for his conduct on the bench. In other words, Chase's
impeachment was a political crisis in which the independence of
the judiciary hung in the balance. 45
It is tempting to perceive the New Deal crisis as not fitting
within the pattern of political crises I have sketched. 46 It is
possible that, by taking a more deferential stance toward
economic regulations, the Court helped to defuse the brewing
controversy or crisis between it and national political
authorities. There are, however, two reasons this perspective is
wrong. On the one hand, there is every reason to think that the
political institutions could or would have dealt with the Court's
opposition to the New Deal. In time, President Roosevelt's
appointees would surely have dominated the Court, at which
point the Court would have shifted its positions on economic due
process and Congress' Commerce Clause powers. On the other
hand, there is still reason to think that the Court did back down
under enormous political pressure not just from the Court-

have deflected the impeachment action initiated against him. Richard A. Posner,
Dworkin, Polemics and the Clinton Impeachment Controuersey, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1023
(2000).
43. See N. E. H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Historians and the Impreachment
Imbroglio: In Search of a Seruicable History, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 473 (2000).
44. See William H. Rehnquist, The American Constitutional Experience: Remarks
of the Chief Justice, 54 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1166-67 (1994).
45. See Stephen B. Presser, Et Tu Raoul? Or the Original Misunderstanding
Misunderstood, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1475 (1991); Stephen B. Presser, The Original
Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 106 (1989).
46. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1751.
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packing plan but perhaps more importantly from Roosevelt's
overwhelming re-election in 1936 and the mid-term elections of
1938. It is credible to think one of the pivotal justices, Owen
Roberts, was ultimately convinced to shift his own position on
the propriety of economic regulation because of the signals sent
by the election of 1936, in which the American people
overwhelmingly re-elected Franklin D. Roosevelt based in part
on his campaign against the Court. 47
A second important clarification involves the causes for
crises. The apparent triggers of a judicial crisis include, among
others, a sharp ideological divide between the leaders of political
and judicial institutions, a very serious social or economic
conflict, and significant public and special interest opposition. 48
Interestingly, there is a clear pattern to the persistent
retaliations undertaken by Congress against the courts:
Democrats (as the party purporting to represent populists and
minorities) have tended to mobilize against the decisions
protecting economic liberties and property rights, while
Republicans (as the party purporting to defend majority and
business interests) have tended to mobilize against decisions
that favor minorities or reduced majoritarian power. 49
Protracted or intense federalism and separation-of-powers
conflicts turn to a significant degree on partisanship and
conflicting desires to control the means to resolve some socially
or politically significant conflict (involving, for instance, the
national economy, civil rights, or national security).
Third, the framework I have sketched for understanding
crises in constitutional law illuminates how the Constitution
binds through its implementation. Many events have not risen
to the level of a constitutional crisis because the contending
parties have framed their arguments in constitutional terms and
accepted that the Constitution provided a process for resolving
their dispute. The electoral dispute of 2000 fits this picture
perfectly, in spite of the outcries that it either came close to
being a crisis or actually was a crisis. 50 It was not a judicial
crisis, because (1) national political authorities did not resist or
47. Compare Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201,
228-39 (1994), and Laura Kalman, Law, Politics and the New Deal, 108 YALE L.J. 2165
(1999).
48. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Three: the Lesson of Lachner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001).
49. See Nagel, supra note 18.
50. Klarman, supra note 9, at 1725-26.
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retaliate against the decision and (2) state political authorities
never had the opportunity to retaliate against the state court
decisions. It was never a political crisis at least at the national
level. This was unlike any of the previous electoral disputes of
1800, 1824, and 1876, all of which ended up in the House, one of
which required a constitutional amendment, 51 and another of
which produced the federal statutory mechanisms on which both
Bush's and Gore's lawyers relied upon, and referred to
repeatedly throughout the conflict. 52 In this dispute, national
political leaders never had the chance to formally contest the
outcome and thus it hardly qualifies as a political crisis. Since
the dispute was not a political crisis, it never had the chance of
becoming a constitutional crisis. No major political leader ever
challenged either the federal courts' authority to resolve the
conflict or claimed the Constitution provided no process for
resolving the dispute. To the contrary, the major parties each
claimed the law and the Constitution were on their side. 53 When
the Court finally settled the dispute, no national political
leaders suggested resisting it.
If the electoral dispute of 2000 was a crisis at all, it was
almost entirely internal to our court system. At its most
intense, it was a contest among federal and state judicial
authorities, but there was never a question of which of these
authorities reigned supreme. 54 Once the Supreme Court decided
Bush u. Gore, 55 the debate was not about whether the Supreme
Court could overturn a state court judgment (settled since
Martin u. Hunter's Lessee 56 ), but rather whether the Court
exercised its lawful authority properly in the facts of this case.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
52. See Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential
Election, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 974 (2001).
53. Indeed, the parties were determined to cast their arguments in the manner
least offensive to the Constitution. At every step, Bush's and Gore's respective advocates
maintained in state and federal courts that the Constitution and relevant statutory
provisions favored their positions. Before the Supreme Court, the prevailing side
argued, for instance, that the Court's precedents on voting rights as well as the
applicable federal statute supported both the Court's jurisdiction and the overruling of
the state supreme court's decision favoring Gore. No matter what one thinks of Bush v.
Gore, the parties claimed constitutional legitimacy, including precedents, for everything
they argued and did. Even if you disagree with some of those precedents (as I am sure
some of the justices and even some of Bush's lawyers did), their disagreement did not
preclude them from relying on those precedents as a legitimate basis for the ultimate
decision.
54. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
55. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
56. 14 U.S. 304.
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Even at the time the decision came down, roughly half of the
country and almost all political authorities largely fell behind
it. 57 Subsequent developments, particularly the war against
terrorism, increase the odds against political retaliation against
the Court for its decision.
In the wide range of conflicts that fall short of a
constitutional crisis, the structure of the Constitution operates
as an imposing force. For instance, the supermajority vote
requirement for removal of impeached officials imposes such a
high hurdle on removal that it cannot be too surprising to find
that only about half of the officials impeached in our history
have also been removed. 58 In other words, the supermajority
vote requirement helps to stack the deck against removal. Thus,
there was never a serious question about whether the Senate
would ever remove Clinton from office for his misconduct related
to Monica Lewinsky.
The structure also provides the means by which the political
branches can correct (or at least try to correct what they regard
as) judicial errors. The Constitution provides a wide variety of
mechanisms that they have used to redress or retaliate against
the Court's mistakes. We saw how quickly political leaders
reacted to correct what they perceived as the error of Chisholm
v. Georgia. 59 In the aftermath of Roe we have seen presidents
deride the decision, call for its overruling, support legislation
designed to weaken it, and seek to appoint justices who would
overturn (or at least severely limit) it; members of Congress,
particularly senators, question its legitimacy and propose both
amendments and different kinds of jurisdictional limits to
overturn or limit the damage of the decision; and at least four
justices prepared to overrule Roe. 60 In other words, the critical
response to Roe has fastidiously tracked constitutional
procedures.
The structure's impact is evident from a survey of the
political crises generated by the electoral disputes of 1800, 1824,
and 1876. In 1800, national leaders were vexed at the omissions
of the original Constitution, and their solution was to change the
Constitution. 61 In 1824, the failure of any of the major
57. See Klarman, supra note 9, at 1748; Friedman, supra note 48, at 1448.
58. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Special Constitutional Structure of the Federal
Impeachment Process, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. !'ROBS. 245 (2000).
59. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
60. See Klarman, supra note 9.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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presidential candidates to get a majority of electoral votes led to
a proceeding in the House in which, Andrew Jackson claimed,
John Quincy Adams entered into a "corrupt bargain" with Henry
Clay to steal the election. 62 Jackson took his case to the
American people, who heard his message and overwhelmingly
elected him to the presidency in 1828. In that circumstance,
there was no need to change the Constitution, because it
provided the political means by which Jackson could seek
redress. In 1876, there were serious questions about the
outcomes of close votes in some states (including Florida) forcing
the House back into the position to resolve the disputes. Relying
on the constitutional language empowering each chamber of
Congress to adopt appropriate procedures to implement their
respective authorities, the House appointed a special
commission, which rendered a rather dubious opinion about how
disputed electoral votes should be counted. Samuel Tildren
graciously accepted the commission's vote, while Rutherford B.
Hayes agreed to serve only one term as a means to quiet
discontent over the decision. Hayes agreed further to cut a deal
with Southern Democrats to end Reconstruction in exchange for
their not challenging further the commission decision. There
was nothing extra-constitutional about these measures.
To the contrary, these informal agreements were arranged
within the checks and balances set forth in the Constitution. A
genuine constitutional crisis was ultimately averted because the
checks and balances of the Constitution proved adequate to force
the disputants into a peaceful resolution of their conflict. In
other words, political crises present prime opportunities to
measure the extent to which the Constitution's checks and
balances can force parties into accommodations. When the
parties to a dispute make recourse to existing constitutional
mechanisms to resolve their differences, there is plainly no
constitutional crisis. 63 When the parties are unable to work out
their differences through existing checks and balances, a
constitutional crisis is likely to ensue.
62. See generally 2 ROBERT VINCENT REMINI, THE COARSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM,
1822-1832 (1998); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF
JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1990); PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN QUINCEY ADAMS: A PlTBLIC LIFE, A
PRIVATE LIFE (1999).

63. For example, the Bush administration claims no novel authority for what its
most aggressive actions in combating terrorism have been. It relies on Supreme Court
precedent and prior presidents' executive orders to support its authority. In attempting
to reconcile its actions with the Constitution, they implicitly ratify the existing
constitutional order.
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The dynamic in a genuine constitutional crisis is, however,
radically different from those of judicial and political crises. It is
here that the limits of written constitutionalism have been not
only reached but also exceeded. This is the rare circumstance in
which the contending parties recognize that the Constitution
provides no answer to their dispute or even the means, as it
exists at the time of their dispute, by which to resolve it.
Consider, again, the example of secession. The contending
sides clearly had their respective arguments, many of which
were claimed to have been grounded in the Constitution or some
authoritative source of constitutional meaning. The difficulty
was that the sides could not agree on how, or even whether, the
Constitution provided the means by which to resolve their
different views on the constitutionality or legitimacy of
secession. Secession was the culmination of the failure of either
political or judicial authorities to settle the legitimacy and
future of slavery on then existing constitutional terms. There
simply was no common or middle ground left for the major
disputants to settle their fundamentally different visions of the
Constitution, including the nation's and states' respective
authorities under it. The middle ground of course would have to
have been something grounded in or consistent with the
Constitution, but none was ever found. 64 Hence, it is only in the
rare circumstance of a constitutional crisis, as I have defined it,
that the Constitution is of no avail. And that is precisely the
point, for the crisis is the anxiety and conflict generated by the
recognition that the Constitution cannot, and does not, solve the
crisis facing the country.
A final clarification involves the relationship between the
framework I have suggest for analyzing crises in constitutional
64. One could argue, I suppose, that the efforts of national political leaders from
the 1840s until Lincoln's election had been attempting in vain to find such common
ground. The Missouri Compromise, the Great Compromise of 1850, and the KansasNebraska Acts conceivably could each be characterized as political attempts to reconcile
the conflict over slavery and states' rights under the Constitution. It was, however, clear
by the time Lincoln was preparing to take office that political authorities had lost hope
in any peaceful, political solution to the problem of slavery. Less than a week before
Lincoln took office, the House and the Senate had passed a constitutional amendment to
prohibit an end to slavery. The amendment provided, "No amendment shall be made to
the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or
interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of
persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State." J.Res. 13, 36th Cong., 2d
Sess., 12 Stat. 251 (1861). The idea behind the amendment was that the process of
amendment had become futile to deal with the crisis over slavery. Most leaders expected
war to come by that point no matter what Lincoln or anyone else tried.
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law and another possible crisis in constitutional law. 65 In 1996,
Professors Mark Tushnet and Louis Seidman of Georgetown
declared that there was a crisis in constitutional theory because
it had lost its way. 66 They expressed concern that civility in
academic discourse about the Constitution no longer seemed
possible. They also worried that constitutional theorists had
become too preoccupied with courts and not enough with the
quality of the decision-making of the political branches. Not
long thereafter, several judges and other prominent scholars
denounced a growing divide between constitutional theory and
practice. 67 They complained that constitutional theory has
become increasingly irrelevant to constitutional practice and
particularly adjudication. Perhaps the most prominent critic of
modern constitutional theory has been Richard Posner, who
argues that constitutional scholars need to care less about
dazzling each other and developing arcane specialities, and care
more about mastering inter-disciplinary disciplines of much
greater use to federal judges. 68 I suspect there are even many

65. This conception of a constitutional crisis has important implications for the
relationship between written constitutionalism and precedent. One important function
of precedent, as I have explained it, is to facilitate commitment to the written
Constitution. How is this possible? The answer is evident from our exploration of the
nature of judicial, political, and constitutional crises and what transforms a judicial or
political crisis into a constitutional crisis. A judicial crisis might exist in circumstances
in which either the scope of the authority of the courts is indeterminate or courts are
challenging the authority of the political branches on grounds unacceptable to them.
Even in the latter circumstances, precedent serves to prevent the so-called judicial crisis
from evolving into a political crisis or, worse, constitutional crisis. Even in the case in
which the court faces a question of first impression, there might be precedent for the
Court's exercising judicial review over a similar or analogous conflict. In this manner,
precedent helps to diffuse anxiety over the Court's exercise of judicial review. Even if
the Court exceeds its authority and triggers political retaliation or dissent, there is
precedent for that: after Dred Scott, Lincoln, for instance, refused to defer ever again to
the Court. If matters degenerate into a political crisis, precedent, broadly understood,
may serve the important function or purpose of providing the hook by which authorities
retain (and exhibit) their commitment to the written Constitution. A political crisis
might, however, transform into a constitutional crisis when there is not only an absence
of any salient judicial precedent but recognition of the absence of no helpful or
meaningful prior experiences, practices, or traditions. A constitutional crisis is thus that
rare circumstance in which the nation and the parties recognize the limits of written
constitutionalism as reflected in the failures of any of the traditional sources of
constitutional meaning, including precedent, to solve the crisis at hand.
66. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996).
67. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993); Richard
A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
68. Posner, supra note 67, at 10.
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students who wonder what the point is of seemingly unending,
increasingly clever academic efforts to resolve the countermajoritarian dilemma. In addition, the fact that the academy is
apparently dominated by political liberals interested in
promoting judicial activism helps to exacerbate the divide
between theory and practice, because most judges are much
more inclined to vigorous judicial restraint. 69
This divide is further exacerbated, Posner claims, by the
general deterioration of academics' performances as public
intellectuals. 70 The reasons for this deterioration are manifold,
including the lure of notoriety of commenting on high-profile
controversies as they are unfolding. 71
Several studies
demonstrate the media's increasing penchant for soft news reporting primarily consisting of commentary or speculation
about scandal - rather than hard news - strictly focusing
reporting data rather than opinions. 72 This penchant is a
function of the growing pressure on news organizations to
increase their audience shares by entertaining their viewers at
least as much as informing them. The media by and large does
not want academics because of their expertise but rather
because of their ability to generate conflict and drama. The
academics who can deliver become celebrities.
I agree with Judge Posner up to the point of blaming the
academy for lacking norms by which to hold the legal scholars
who debate themselves (and their profession) as celebrities or
scandal-mongers in the media, 73 but the suggestion of a crisis is
itself the problem. Contrary to Posner's assertions, the legal
academy has plenty of mechanisms already in place to hold legal
academics responsible as public intellectuals. The trick is to
recognize and fortify each of these. First, the legal academy
itself polices a good deal of academic commentary, so that
academics who spend much time at all as public intellectuals are
likely to receive evaluations from their colleagues as well as
69.
(1998).
70.
71.
72.

See generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

Posner, supra note 67, at 4.
Posner, supra note 67, at 2.
See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other
Institutional Ramifications of the Clinton Scandals, 60 MD. L. REV. 59, 96 (2001); BILL
KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA (1999)
(explaining that in a "search to reclaim audience, the press has moved more toward
sensationalism, entertainment, and opinion"); ROBERT WATERMAN MCCHESNEY, RICH
MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999).
73. Posner, supra note 67, at 10.
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their students. Posner's book is only one such example, as are
the many articles Posner cites that have been written by law
professors denouncing some of their colleagues' advocacy as
public intellectuals. 74 Second, the media itself does more
policing than perhaps we give it credit, particularly with respect
to publicizing the possible conflicts-of-interest of some
commentators. Several organizations dedicated to evaluating
journalists' performances have recommended for some time that
news organizations undertake more efforts to disclose their
commentators' affiliations or biases.
Third, while
entrepreneurship is an important norm in the academy, its
maintenance does not mean law professors cannot monitor their
own public commentary.
Their challenge is not, as Posner suggests, somehow to
employ the same methodology in different fora, for this would be
impossible given the limitations and norms of different fora.
Instead, the challenge for legal scholars is to meet the criteria
for excellence in each of the different fora in which they
participate. If scholars write editorials, then it is fair to hold
them to the standards of professional editorials. If scholars
become pundits, then of course we should be prepared to hold
them to the standards (if there are any) of punditry. If scholars
choose to comment in newspapers or the media as public
intellectuals, then we should hold them to the standard of public
intellectuals commenting in the media. And if scholars return to
the academy and return to plying their trade there, then we
should hold them to the standards of excellence in the fields in
which they claim expertise.
If there is anything missing in these scenarios, it might be
the failures of different fora to develop standards of
performance. These failures are hardly irremediable. In the
legal academy, standards are our stock and trade. Everything is
graded, and everything is judged. So, I am not concerned and
consider there to be no crisis if some legal scholars make
outlandish comments outside of the academy. My primary job indeed, the one I am trying to perform today - is to ensure that
they do not repeat them here.

74. It is interesting that in determining the people who should qualify as public
intellectuals in his study, Posner does not consider polling experts in different fields
about which of their members they might consider as public intellectuals.
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IV. CONCLUSION

I have intended to share with you some thoughts about the
ways in which divisive constitutional issues get addressed,
responsibly in my view, outside of the courts. To be sure, the
courts, particularly with judges as skilled, disciplined, and
honorable as Judge Browning, have served as an indispensable
institution for implementing and clarifying the meaning of the
Constitution in an important range of cases. But it would be
shame, even perhaps a crisis I suggest, if we were to fail to
recognize that the Constitution's continued viability requires the
respect and adherence of all of those institutions and actors in
whom it vests responsibility, including each of us. In the end, it
is through maintaining all of the procedures authorized by the
Constitution and respecting all of the Constitution's guarantees
that full implementation of the Constitution takes place, and
crises are averted.

